Pluralism, an aside

Cross posted at Political Arguments.

Erik makes several thoughtful points about the liberal reaction to the perceived realignment of the American electorate. But I think he is wrong on the meaning of pluralism, the importance of moral sociology, and the shape that institutional design should take. I'll deal only with the first one in this post.

Allow me to reconstruct Erik's argument. Liberals, he argues, are inconsistent when they claim to respect Republican values but then dismiss those same values are wrong. They are also disingenuous in privileging certain kinds of values over others without admitting that such a distinction is not natural, but itself a value judgment. I presume that the values so privileged are things like political liberty, equality of opportunity and economic welfare, whereas religious fervor, tradition, and honor are refused the same importance. But the challenge to democracy lies not in the content of those values, but in the mechanisms that allow Americans to make collective social choices. The issue, Erik argues, is not "the individual psychological, economic, or moral motivations of the persons that voted in this election", but rather "the rules and mechanisms we have in place for forming social welfare functions".

more...I agree that the real problem is institutional design. But a liberal theory does not need to abdicate moral judgment over different world views. Some values are indefensible, some world views abhorrent. Even a theory that eschews making comprehensive judgments over the nature of the good life—Rawls's political liberalism is my paradigm—can nonetheless explain how some world views are incompatible with our best understandings of political society. Inadmissible world views, Rawls writes, are (1) those "requiring the repression or degradation of certain persons on, say, racial, or ethnic, or perfectionist grounds", as well as (2) those that are not objectionable per se, but would "fail to gain adherents under the political and social conditions of a just constitutional regime."

Rawls gives ancient Athens and the antebellum American South as examples of the first case. But the example of the second case should also be familiar: a religion that "can survive only if it controls the machinery of the state and is able to practice effective intolerance" as an example of the second. (PL, p. 196) The dismissal of the first kind of world view, one would hope, is uncontroversial. But the second appeals to a great number of American voters, who are wedded to the idea that the United States is not only historically but normatively and teleologically a Christian nation. Bob Jones is the most vitriolic example:

In your re-election, God has graciously granted America?though she doesn't deserve it?a reprieve from the agenda of paganism. You have been given a mandate. We the people expect your voice to be like the clear and certain sound of a trumpet. Because you seek the Lord daily, we who know the Lord will follow that kind of voice eagerly.

Don't equivocate. Put your agenda on the front burner and let it boil. You owe the liberals nothing. They despise you because they despise your Christ. Honor the Lord, and He will honor you.

(Via Josh Marshall)

Now, there is a difference between recognizing the central tenet of value pluralism and respecting a world view that rejects all pretense of reasonableness. In its essence, value pluralism postulates that there are multiple sources of value in the world—duty, happiness, beauty, honor, liberty—and that these values are not reductible to each other (they are ultimate) and cannot be measured on the same scale (they are incommensurable). Some values we may recognize, but not share, in the same way that I accept that Vosges are delicious chocolates, although I despise the taste and smell of chocolate. A world view that cherishes religious faith, nationalism, and honor I can also recognize as worthy of respect, although I prefer a world view that favors skepticism, cosmopolitanism, and a good credit record.

Bob Jones is something of a scarecrow, I admit. Others have made more compelling arguments for policies with which I disagree. Take, for instance, the view of some Mormon and Catholic opponents to same-sex marriage:

I am certain that should same sex marriage be allowed, private religious universities such as my alma mater, Brigham Young University, would still consider same sex relationships to violate their honor codes (in that link, see especially the section governing conduct- all students must commit to living the honor code and live it or they cannot attend Brigham Young University) or bylaws or other university regulations. Since these schools would then be "discriminating" against same sex relationships by forbidding them amongst their students, they would likely be denied their tax benefits, which the Bob Jones University court noted "will inevitably have a substantial impact on the operation of private religious schools," id. at 603-04, as well as on any donors whose donations would no longer be tax deductible.

(Via Will Baude)

The reference is to Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983). In that case the United States Supreme Court held that a fundamentalist Christian University could be denied the tax-exempt status usually enjoyed by institutions of higher education because it discriminated on the basis of race. The worry, some religious folks argue, is that, if homophobia ever invoked the same moral opprobrium as racism, then religious institutions could be stripped of state subsidies if they did not extend spousal benefits to same sex partners.

This is a ripe occasion for both sides to show reasonableness, in Rawls's sense, to extend to the other fair terms of cooperation that the other can accept. For liberals to insist on every church's endorsement of non-discrimination is simply unacceptable. Even to accuse traditionalist Christians of not being good liberal citizens unless they carry out all of their civic engagements in a liberal fashion is, if not unreasonable, at least in poor taste. But for those same traditionalists to want to legislate their comprehensive doctrines on a host of people that do not, will not, indeed cannot accept them is also unreasonable. A sensible solution would be to guarantee strong associational rights to churches and other civic groups that would insulate them from having to justify their beliefs to the public at large.

Some such overtures are surely being done. But I suspect that it is easier for the political liberal to do this than for the traditionalist Christian. That is because political liberals—unlike comprehensive liberals like Susan Okin—are not committed, in principle, to proselytism. Traditionalist Christians are so committed. It is indeed a tenet of the faith to witness and seek converts, and it would be selfish, sinful even, to allow hapless sould to be tempted by worldly pleasures if one could avoid it. That proselytism, when it turns political, is simply unacceptable in a liberal democratic society, because it frames the terms of cooperation as either coversion or exclussion.

I can understand the value of faith and tradition although if I don't share it, and even respect the genuine good that a believer draws from her religion although if the content of her particular faith is one I find distasteful. But liberal respect is reciprocal, even by definition. I cannot give equal consideration, than, to a world view that can only thrive under conditions of illiberality.


UPDATE: Maureen Dowd makes a similar point about the take-no-prisoners attitude of the evangelical conservative vanguard in today's New York Times.

Yet somehow I'm not getting a peace, charity, tolerance and forgiveness vibe from the conservatives and evangelicals who claim to have put their prodigal son back in office.

I'm getting more the feel of a vengeful mob - revved up by rectitude - running around with torches and hatchets after heathens and pagans and infidels.